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DRAMATURGIES OF SPRACHKRITIK: RAINER WERNER
FASSBINDER’S BLUT AM HALS DER KATZE AND PETER
HANDKE’S KASPAR
Twentieth-century literature has been fascinated by language, more precisely,
perhaps, by the disjunction of word and meaning. Few literary works, however,
have attempted to approach these problems from the perspective of their linguistic
foundations. The dramatic medium, with its possibilities of contrasting text
with image, might suggest itself as particularly well suited for such an investigation.
Peter Handke’s Kaspar (premie`re 11 May 1967, Theater am Turm, Frankfurt and
Sta¨dtische Bu¨hnen, Oberhausen) is probably the best-known example of a play
about the mechanisms of language.1 Ever since its first performance it has generated
interest and stimulated much critical comment. This major play is not the only one
to make linguistics its focal point. Rainer Werner Fassbinder’s Blut am Hals der Katze
(premie`re 20 March 1971, Sta¨dtische Bu¨hnen, Nuremberg) also focuses on the
figure of the linguistic tabula rasa, yet it engages the medium in a very different way.
To my knowledge, only one scholarly article has been published on the play.2 In this
article I examine the dramaturgical structures that support a comprehensive
Sprachkritik in both plays, with a particular emphasis on the tension between stage
and auditorium.
Kaspar now has the status of a modern classic and is a staple of many modern
drama courses. By virtue of this I have assumed that its plot and the figures of
Kaspar and the Einsager are familiar to the reader. Blut, on the other hand, has
drifted into obscurity, and I shall thus spend some time outlining and analysing its
defining dramaturgical moments, with a view to contrasting them with those of the
better-known Kaspar. A couple of reasons may account for this discrepancy in
reception (I should not, however, like to link any of them with the plays’ aesthetic
qualities, as should become evident later). Handke’s profile at the time was far
higher than Fassbinder’s; he had achieved prominence through both his association
with enfant terrible director Claus Peymann and his own much publicized attack on
the Gruppe 47 in Princeton, in 1968. Fassbinder, by contrast, had yet to develop as a
‘media phenomenon’. He was known in the South (Blut was commissioned by the
city of Nuremberg for the Du¨rerjahr) but his work was not as widely propagated as
Handke’s (the antitheater had no publishing deal with a firm such as Suhrkamp
either). In fact, in certain reviews he was considered an epigone of the young
Austrian.3 His theatre work also seems to have been eclipsed by his films. It is not
untypical to find remarks such as ‘Fassbinder learned to make films in the theatre’,4
which see the cinematic output as the culmination of his apprenticeship at the
antitheater.
1 In Peter Handke, Stu¨cke 1 (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1972), hereafter K.
2 Erik MacDonald, ‘Rainer Werner Fassbinder and the Politics of Simulation: Two Plays’, Journal of Dramatic
Theory and Criticism, 5 (1990), 131–50.
3 See, for example, Ernst Wendt, ‘Dramen u¨ber Zersto¨rung, Leiden, Sprachlosigkeit im Alltag — auf der
Flucht vor den großen politischen Stoffen?’, Theater heute, 5 (1971), 32–40 (p. 32).
4 Christian Braad Thomson, Fassbinder: The Life and Work of a Provocative Genius, trans. by Martin Chalmers
(London: Faber, 1997), p. 45.
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Blut is about an alien, Phoebe Zeitgeist, who has come to Earth to find out about
democracy. The character is in fact taken from an American comic-book series
written by Michael O’Donoghue and Frank Springer. Her name, as will become
evident, is ironic. As Fassbinder puts it in his introductory remarks: ‘Phoebe
Zeitgeist hat aber Schwierigkeiten, sie versteht die Sprache der Menschen nicht,
obwohl sie die Worte gelernt hat.’5 From the outset, then, a tension is established
between the situations Phoebe encounters and the way in which she processes them
linguistically. The tension between Saussure’s langue and parole are signalled early.
The same can be said of Kaspar, yet the way in which the material is treated by
Fassbinder reveals a complex dramaturgical method that changes over the three
phases of the play.
The first phase presents the spectator with the typologized characters who recur
throughout the play (for example, Der Polizist, Die Frau des toten Soldaten). They
either deliver monologues by themselves or address monologues to Phoebe, who is
present but mute. The two scene types alternate. There are eighteen short scenes in
the first phase. A symmetry emerges in that the first character to have a scene with
Phoebe, Der Polizist, is the last to have his solus. Correspondingly, Der Metzger, the
first solus (and the second scene), appears in the seventeenth scene with Phoebe. The
only exceptions to this mirrored scheme are Scenes 9 and 10, which would have
featured Die Geliebte and Phoebe, and Die Geliebte on her own. Instead we see
Der Liebhaber and Phoebe, and then Die Geliebte solus. One assumes that this was
so that Die Geliebte was not seen in some way as the central character. All the same,
Fassbinder is still interested in maintaining the symmetrical structure for the most
part, something that constructs a sense of order and cohesion to the spectator. The
importance of this device within the dramaturgy of play as a whole will be addressed
later.
The second phase consists of a further thirty-six short scenes. All feature two of
the nine typologized characters and Phoebe, who observes the vignettes before
repeating lines that she has heard within them at the end of each scene. The lines
she chooses follow no ostensible pattern; she does not favour beginnings, middles,
or endings (which might tell us something about her mind-set with respect to those
of both the characters and the audience). Each character has one (and only one)
dialogue with each of the others in the cycle.
The third phase is a party attended by all the characters, including Phoebe. It is
here that Phoebe deploys the language she has learned in phase two. Towards the
end of the party Phoebe starts to bite the necks of the party-goers, one by one, until
she is the only one left alive.6 Having done this she recites a section of Hegel’s
Wissenschaft der Logik (1812–16).7
5 Blut am Hals der Katze, in Rainer Werner Fassbinder, Sa¨mtliche Stu¨cke, ed. by Michael To¨teberg, (Frankfurt
a.M.: Verlag der Autoren, 1991), p. 498, hereafter B.
6 The alternative title of the play, which appeared in the programme of the world premie`re, was Marilyn
Monroe contre les vampires. What seems to be happening, therefore, is that Phoebe has observed the mutually
parasitic behaviour of the characters and has become a vampire herself, reproducing her surroundings once
more.
7 She recites the first paragraph of the first chapter of the section entitled ‘Die Subjektivita¨t’ from the second
part of the work (B, p. 239). I shall return to an interpretation of this concluding speech later. Both Denis
Calandra, who has translated a selection of Fassbinder’s plays, and MacDonald, who, I assume, read Calandra’s
introductory remarks to the volume of translations, name Kant as the intertext’s source (Rainer Werner
Fassbinder, Plays, ed. and trans. by Denis Calandra (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985),
p. 11). MacDonald is keen to point to Kant as a symbolic father-figure, in Lacanian terms (p. 145), whereas
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From this brief outline, one can see that the central figures in Blut and Kaspar
differ greatly, although they play similar roles as language learners. One of the main
interests in Kaspar focuses on whether the protagonist is figuratively tortured8 by the
three Einsager (that the process of acquiring language is made painful by their
mendacity)9 or that pain is a prerequisite when learning a language, regardless of
who is teaching it.10 Such fundamental issues do not arise in Blut in that Phoebe is
never really exposed to the pain of language acquisition in the play. Kaspar has to
have the sentence with which he enters the stage driven out of him to make him
receptive to the Einsager. Phoebe is more an imitator and is never required to have
language beaten into her (we assume that this process has already taken place on
her own planet). Her problems with language are based far more in the assembly of
words into sentences. In both plays, however, the playwrights employ the central
character as a means of investigating the structures of language in society by dint of
the characters’ linguistic artlessness.
The three phases of Blut treat the social personae of the typologized characters
very differently. In the monologic first phase identity seems fairly cohesive. The nine
give their individualized pictures of violence, suffering, and/or oppression. Der
Metzger in Scene 2, for example, tells of a girlfriend he once had, who made his
dreary working life and the regular blows received at the hands of his ‘Meister’ seem
bearable. She left him, and now he buys sex every Friday and continues the cycle of
violence, for he is now the ‘Meister’. Glimpses of personal tragedy and repeated
inhumanity pervade the first phase. The characterizations appear to represent
standard psychological-realist fare. The speeches paint bleak pictures of everyday
life and the characters never break frame with metatheatrical discourse. In the
second phase the potted biographies that provided the audience with stable points
of contact are radically called into question. If we follow the plotting for Der
Metzger we find the following scenarios: he plays a dog to Das Modell’s dominatrix;
he tries to calm Die Frau des toten Soldaten after having hit her; he is a cellmate in
prison with Das Ma¨dchen; he boasts of his earnings to a former football team-mate,
Der Soldat; he is the sceptical investor in a car-wash that Der Lehrer is trying to set
up; he is the other man in a love-triangle featuring Die Geliebte; he is a hard-nosed
creditor when Der Liebhaber discovers his wife has run up huge debts; he is a
worker who will not strike because he has his own capital, by contrast with his more
sympathetic workmate, Der Polizist. The variety of roles and personae is highly
disparate. It would be difficult to identify a single character or personality within
the diversity. Even if one were to impose such an interpretation, by viewing the
short vignettes as scenes from a life, their sheer break-neck speed refuses the actor
the depth of interiority to sustain a character. The spectator is denied the consistency
Hegel could be seen as one of the bastard sons, self-confident and iconoclastic. Calandra may have identified
Kant as the source because of the language and categories employed in the speech. Hegel, however, is a more
controversial choice of philosopher. The associations with Marx, a figure still looming large at the time in the
wake of the upheavals of 1968, are hard to avoid. Hegel is thus more provocative as the provenance of the final
text; Kant, in comparison, is authoritative and untouchable.
8 This concept is taken from Handke’s much-quoted preface to the play, in which he says he could have
called Kaspar ‘Sprechfolterung’ (K, p. 103).
9 See, for example, M. Read, ‘Peter Handke’s Kaspar and the Power of Negative Thinking’, Forum for Modern
Language Studies, 29 (1993), 126–48, or Jeanette R. Malkin, ‘ ‘‘Think What You Are Saying’’: Verbal Politics in
the Early Plays of Handke and Kroetz’, Modern Drama, 33 (1990), 363–79.
10 See, for example, Christa Dixon, ‘Peter Handkes Kaspar: Ein Modellfall’, German Quarterly, 46 (1973),
31–34, or Bettina Soestwohner, ‘Kaspar oder das Theater der Sprache’, Colloquia Germanica, 22 (1989), 137–50.
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required to promote the identification that was possible in the first phase. As a
result, the spectator is prevented from developing the relationship established in
phase one and is forced to re-evaluate basic ‘realist’ categories and to adjust to a
more active form of spectatorship.
The range of texts each actor is made to speak undermines a coherence in
characterization. The order in which they are spoken also frustrates the spectator’s
ability merely to digest the performance and encourages a reconsideration of the
more conventional mapping of one actor onto one part (or of one actor onto
doubled, yet psychologically consistent parts). The structure of phase two is also at
odds with a unifying sense of character. The near-symmetrical distribution in the
first phase is severely disrupted by the apparently random set of encounters between
the figures in the second. The order in which the characters take the stage and
interact with each other follows no pattern; there is no numerical series that
determines when or with whom a particular character appears. This is a deliberate
device (by virtue of the fact that each character meets the other once and only once)
to attack the cohesion of the characters of phase one and thus openly to challenge a
set of psychological and dramaturgical assumptions. ‘Characters’ are replaced by
‘figures’ that are too contradictory to be reduced to helpful shorthands for either the
actor or the audience.
The apparently random distribution of the second-phase scenes and the larger
structure that exposes an underlying organizing principle signal two important
points. First, they fail to privilege any one actor, so that potential meanings may not
emerge through overexposure. The process of de-centring the individual affects all
equally; none of the human subjects can stave it off, regardless of the social roles he
or she plays. Second, the presence of enforced equality points back to the
constructed nature of the piece. The paradox of ‘controlled haphazardness’ confirms
the play’s artifice and acknowledges its limits. Individuality, carefully crafted by the
(almost perfect) symmetry of the first eighteen scenes is exposed as a dramaturgical
ruse. Thus, the organization of the second phase not only allows the spectator to
assess a discrepancy between actor and role but also contextualizes this strategy
within the play itself.
The scenes themselves are also of interest because they have no stage-directions:
all is suggested by spoken (and body) language. It is also fair to assume that because
of the speed of the thirty-six scene changes there would be little by way of stage set
to indicate where the scenes were taking place. Even costume might be ruled out as
an interpretative sign, for reasons of expense and time required to change. The
spectator has to find his or her way into the brief situations without the help of the
usual visual signs. There is also no continuity of a distinguishable character, as was
noted above, and no ‘epic banner’ to set the scene, which also frustrates the process
of easy comprehension. Thus, by virtue of the audience’s ability to decipher meanings
from the short scenes, it becomes implicated in the short bursts of action. The
spectator’s recognition of the unpleasant situations betrays a familiarity that by
extension becomes disturbing. This mechanism of tacit identification is then
ironically checked by the character who does not understand; Phoebe digests the
scenes only in so far as she repeats certain lines or phrases at the scenes’ respective
conclusions.
In a short period of stage time the scenes’ contexts are imparted without any
direct verbal reference to them. In this sort of whirl, the spectator has to work
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quickly to make sense of the vignettes. Actors whose characters were at the receiving
end of an act of oppression might become the oppressors themselves, only to return
to the role of the victim once more later. The spectator is forced to realize that
meaning is being generated by his or her recognition of linguistic and kinetic signs.
The status of sign as indicator and not substance (and not, therefore, as inevitable)
is attested in the closing line of each short scene. Its language is wrenched out of the
context that was so familiar to the audience by the silent observer. Phoebe takes her
linguistic material from phrases spoken by any of the characters involved in the
scene from any moment in the scene and then forms a new sentence. Language that
already required active input from the spectator in order to create meaning is put
into a new sequence. The langue is given a new parole. The process calls the scene
into question by undermining the semantic and syntactic basis that gave the
spectator access to it in the first place. Fassbinder’s critique of the cliche´s that
oppress his figures extends into the auditorium.
At the party, which forms the third phase of the play, Phoebe goes on to reuse the
language she has distilled in phase two. The characters who were introduced in the
first phase, and were shattered into various personae in the second, return in the
third as a similarly fragmented mixture. The party displays a fluid set of human
traits within the social contexts already presented. The major interest in this phase
is the relationship between what Phoebe says and how it is interpreted by the others.
To¨teberg defines the third phase as ‘Dialoge mit Phoebe, wobei sie die gelernten
Sa¨tze falsch anwendet’.11 MacDonald contends that her speech is ‘a series of non-
sequiturs’ and that she ‘shatters the structures necessary to maintain the other
characters’ narratives’ (Macdonald, pp. 144–45). Phoebe is not, however, quite as
out of step as the two critics may believe, rather her function here is altogether more
challenging.
Phoebe’s lines at the party are peculiar in that they seem to follow a pattern but
then occasionally diverge from it. The pattern is quite straightforward: Phoebe
delivers her lines at different points during the party in the order in which she has
learned them, which seems to indicate a lack of discrimination. However, there are
points where a line that should follow does not, and there are a couple of other
discrepancies as well. The lines ‘bist du wahnsinnig?’ (B, p. 518), ‘du bist gemein’
(B, p. 520), ‘sie sind gemein’ (B, p. 521), ‘das hab ich nicht gewollt’ (B, p. 527),
and ‘ich war krank’ (B, p. 532) are all missing at the party. The lines do not differ
greatly in content from other utterances made by Phoebe in the phase, yet the
attempts to experiment with language learnt by omitting it betokens conscious
agency. In addition, the original Phoebe lines ‘ein kind, das hat man doch sicher.
wenn du kein vertrauen hast, dann ist alles zuviel’ (B, p. 528) are inverted at
the party (the second sentence comes first in B, p. 546), and the lines ‘die zeit
macht dich reif und dabei vergeht sie. gegen kranke gedanken gibt es
gebete’ (B, p. 530) appear in the party scene with an extra ‘die zeit macht dich
reif und dabei vergeht die’ after them (B, p. 546). Again, the decisions seem
arbitrary, none the less they signal an impulse to experiment and a certain
playfulness. These modifications demonstrate that Phoebe is being selective; there
is no reason to doubt her memory. because she is able to deliver all the other lines
11 Michael To¨teberg, ‘Rainer Werner Fassbinder’, in Kritisches Lexikon zur deutschsprachigen Gegenwartsliteratur,
9 vols, ed. by Heinz Ludwig Arnold (Munich: text+kritik, 1986), iii, p. 6 of the entry.
MLR 95:4 (2000), 1053-63 © Modern Humanities Research Assn
Dramaturgies of ‘Sprachkritik’1058
both in the correct order and with accuracy. This consciousness signals an attack on
the dominant parole of oppression and thus functions more dynamically and
purposefully than To¨teberg’s and MacDonald’s contentions. The linguistic struc-
tures that confronted the spectator in the second phase and were revealed as
insidious are consciously attacked by the usage of an outsider. Of course, Phoebe is
met with incredulity and bemusement (for example, liebhaber: Du hast zu viel
getrunken (B, p. 541), or metzger: Seltsam, diese Person (B539) ), which is the
audience’s initial reaction, too. Yet more often than one would expect, her ‘random’
contributions evince curiosity or agreement (lehrer: Ja, das ist die Weisheit des
Volkes. Ich wu¨rde nicht wagen, das zu verachten (B, p. 538), or polizist: Die hat
Phantasie. Ihr Arschlo¨cher. Der fa¨llt was ein, der Frau, im Gegensatz zu euch
lahmen Enten (B, p. 546) ). Not surprisingly, both Der Lehrer and Der Polizist later
grow weary of her linguistic challenges and join the others in dismissing her. What
is important is that she injects a vitality into the proceedings with her peculiar
gambits. Vitality is something conspicuous by its absence throughout the play. To a
certain extent this is because of the unimaginative and tired use of language
throughout the play (which finds an analogue in the familiarity of the scenes in the
second phase and the familiarity of their violence).
Cliche´s crop up throughout as ready-made solutions to or ways out of the many
problems that arise in phases two and three. Phoebe’s sometimes sententious lines
have such qualities, too, yet seem to engage the characters in phase three because of
their freshness in the of the banal chit-chat. Phoebe can only quote: she holds a
mirror to the mannerisms and behaviour of the nine figures and distortingly reflects
them back in unfamiliar contexts. This is contrasted with the use of cliche´ and dead
metaphor (as well as the repetitious cycles of language-encoded oppression) by the
nine figures. The discrepancy between Phoebe’s usage and that of the others opens
up new discursive possibilities and offers a language-based response to the recurring
language and motifs in the short scenes.
Here it might be well to turn to Kaspar, where there is also a figure who is taught
language by repetition and who then combines words out of context at the end of
the play. The main preoccupation of Blut is clearly the role of language as a social
phenomenon. The various speech acts to which the spectator is witness are a central
factor in the course and outcome of each oppressive situation. Kaspar, too, introduces
and then goes on to develop the social implications of language, here through a
clever parody of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s linguistic theories. References to the
philosopher’s Logische-philosophische Abhandlung (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) are
placed at judicious points of Kaspar’s speech-training. Handke prefaces what will
become evident as Wittgenstein’s thought with a modified quotation that Witt-
genstein used to preface the Tractatus. In Scene 20 we hear from the Einsager, ‘fu¨r
einen ordentlichen Gegenstand brauchst du nur einen Satz mit drei Worten’
(K, p. 127).12 By Scenes 23 and 24 one finds direct evidence of the famous ‘picture
theory’ of language, when the Einsager say, for example, ‘jeder Gegenstand muß
ein Bild von einem Gegenstand sein’, or ‘ein Tisch ist ein wahrer Tisch, wenn ein
Bild von Tisch mit dem Tisch u¨bereinstimmt’ (K, pp. 129, 130). Handke sets up a
12 The quotation comes from a fellow Austrian, Ferdinand Ku¨rnberger: ‘Und alles, was man weiß, nicht bloß,
was man rauschen und brausen geho¨rt hat, la¨ßt sich in drei Worten sagen’, in Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus/Logische-Philosophische Abhandlung, trans. by C. K. Ogden (London: Routledge, 1981), p. 25.
This appears as the work’s motto.
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method, through which Kaspar is to be indoctrinated, that superficially seems
‘natural’ or ‘common-sense’: that is, that language is directly derived from an
objective outside world. As Malkin puts it, ‘Kaspar is taught that speech is prior to,
and the limits of, thought’ (Malkin, p. 374). We perceive objects or events and find
a useful shorthand, a word, to refer to them. The simplicity of the process is
vouchsafed by the transformed Ku¨rnberger quotation. A world of order is created
in which each word represents an ideal, essential, or Platonic version of the object
or event. Thus a table that has been knocked over is no longer ‘a table’; it is ‘a table
that has been knocked over’. Even in the most un-ideological of objects, a covert,
orderly meaning is predicating its overt semantic one. The word no longer describes
its object (because, for example, a table is no longer a table when it is not standing
on its legs), it imposes a desired state upon that object, too. Human influence
modifies the word considered a shorthand and creates a ‘non-natural’ meaning.
The social implications of Handke’s critique of Wittgenstein are enormous. The
dominant ideology creates its own standards and then seeks to hide such artifice
under the naive defence that language is merely a reading-off of the external world.
Kaspar then deploys the ‘transparent’ vocabulary in a series of loaded slogans in
Scene 25, such as ‘Jeder ist fu¨r seinen Fortschritt verantwortlich’, or ‘Jede Neu-
ordnung erzeugt Unordnung’ (K, p. 131, 132). The frequent use of ‘jeder’ and its
other forms, as well as a sententious use of verbs, help to bolster the universalizing
tone of the pronouncements and to hide the loaded nature of the slogans. As
spectators, however, we can appreciate the dramatic irony of the scene: there are
sixty-six such phrases, which become all the more self-parodistic as the scene
progresses. Also, Kaspar’s actions during the scene (he tidies up the untidy stage, he
makes it orderly) ironize the texts through his blind obedience. It is telling, and
indeed a final nod to the audience, that by the scene’s conclusion, one object, the
wardrobe, will not bend and remains defiantly open. The transition from household
objects (Scenes 21, 23, and 24) to social prescription (Scene 25) illustrates the
pernicious divisiveness that underlies the ‘picture theory’.
The linguistic and social critique of the play is highly theatrical. A cursory reading
of the text makes one aware that there are almost always two texts at work in the
play. Down the left-hand column are Kaspar’s lines and stage-directions, on the
right those of the Einsager. What the spectator sees, therefore, is a constant
interaction between the two sides, which is sometimes in tandem, but mostly apart.
The contradiction between the two texts pushes the spectator away from the events
on stage because he or she is continually being made to contrast two differing sets of
signs. The interpretation of meaning is the product of the audience’s critical
judgements with respect to the dialectical tension of the material. In this sense, the
dramaturgy is solidly Brechtian. However, the audience is brought back to the
quotidian during the interval: the conscious artifice of the theatre is contrasted with
a collage of extracts from ‘the real world’. The ‘Pausentexte’, which comprise
Scene 59 and are to be played in the foyer, are only a suggestion for a text. Handke
writes that whatever words are used, they should be ‘zusammengesetzt aus Bandauf-
nahmen der Einsager, Gera¨uscheinschu¨ben, Originalaufnahmen von echten Parteifu¨hrern,
Pa¨psten, o¨Ventlichen Sprechern jeder Art, auch von Staats- und Ministerpra¨sidenten, vielleicht auch
von echten Dichtern, die zu Anla¨ssen sprechen. Die Sa¨tze sind niemals vollsta¨ndig’ (K, p. 166).
This shift of frame allows the audience to play Kaspar’s role to the tapes’ Einsager.
The spectator is exposed to the intertextual construction of views, opinions, and ‘the
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natural’, too. Yet words are not the only object of the critique. The ‘Gera¨uscheinschu¨be’
(K, p. 166), mentioned in the introduction to the ‘Pausentexte’, make us aware of
the commodified nature of noises and sounds too. The most profound example of
this is at the end of the scene, where a cacophony of bells, buzzers, gongs, sirens,
and rattles signifies that the second part of the theatrical event is about to begin.
The use of the traditional sign, the bell, and its Verfremdung within the gamut of aural
signs, points to the conventions taken for granted and to a possible escape from
them. (This possibility, and its attendant problems, will be discussed in connection
with the use of intertexts and quotations later.) Consequently, the actor–audience
dynamic in Blut is almost the reverse of that of Kaspar. In the former, the audience is
drawn into naturalistic vignettes before it is distanced by Phoebe; in the latter it is
critical from the outset because of the foregrounded theatricality, only to be
confronted with its own insinuation in the signifying chain at the interval. The
pronounced and enforced transformation of the audience’s role in these plays is
both didactic (in their Sprachkritik) and dynamic (in their changes of dramaturgical
cadence).
Both plays criticize language as a means of social control by pointing to the
restrictive contexts of language deployment. The repetition of oppressive situations
points to an intertextual cycle, where each power relationship quotes another. The
sense of language as quotation is important in Kaspar as well as in Blut. In Kaspar one
finds a range of quotations and intertexts. As well as the intertexts from the Tractatus
and ‘the real world’, there are (sometimes modified) lines and echoes from Goethe,
Feuerbach and Daumer (see below), Horva´th, Shakespeare, the Bible, and Bu¨chner.
Such employment of foreign texts leads Read to assert that Kaspar is able to go
beyond the ‘world of rational discourse and the purely functional use of language’
(Read, p. 133) of the Einsager to investigate and experience the other, which
unconsciously replaces the father figure in Kaspar’s first sentence. The historical
Kaspar Hauser, as described by Anselm Ritter von Feuerbach and G. F. Daumer,
was supposed to have appeared in Nuremberg with the sentence, ‘ein Reiter mo¨chte
ich werden, wie mein Vater gewesen ist’. Handke changes this to ‘ich mo¨cht ein
solcher werden wie einmal ein andrer gewesen ist’. This distinction, which desires a
state of otherness, is an important modification. Not only does it situate Kaspar
somewhere between a past (‘einmal’) and a future (‘mo¨chte [. . .] werden’), it also
calls his individuality into question, and I shall show why this is crucial presently.
The other, however, is a peculiar category in Kaspar because it is not original. It is
taken from a source just like the rest of his language, yet it is the only means of
liberating language from its present context.
A Shakespeare quotation used by Handke will explain the paradox. Kaspar
concludes with a quotation from Othello (‘Ziegen und Affen’, K, pp. 197–98,
compare Othello, iv.i.259). It comes at the end of a speech that seems to form
disparate nouns into pairs. By this time there are several other Kaspars13 on stage,
‘challenging’ the objects on stage, such as the table or the chairs, by laughing at
them, costuming them, imitating them, and pulling them offstage. Action and
13 Originally they had served the Einsager in Scenes 33, 35, 37, 39, 41, and 43 by illustrating ideal ways of
dealing with situations suggested by the Einsager. After the interval they become more rebellious and anarchic.
They also represent an attack on individuality, similar to that in Blut. The Kaspar of the first part of the play
can no longer be separated from the others. His idiosyncrasies are reproduced by the other Kaspars and we
are shown a world of faceless uniformity.
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language seem to mirror each other: both try to make their objects, their referends,
‘unmo¨glich’ (K, p. 196). By now the Kaspars are indistinguishable (a theatrical
critique of ‘the original’), so the text directs the Kaspar furthest downstage to speak
the final speech. His free combination of random words gets stuck at the
Shakespearean intertext, which is then repeated a further eight times. Critics have
responded to the curtain line in a variety of ways. Jeffrey Herrick detects a tragic
resonance by tracing the intertext back to its source. Othello recalls words earlier
used by Iago and has thus accepted Iago’s distorted ideas on human behaviour. Gay
McAuley looks to the content of the line itself and says Kaspar ‘reiterates the animal
nature that language was supposed to free him from’.14 Both ideas point to a
negativity, that Kaspar is unable to escape from a suffocating world created by
language. Read, as I have already noted, suggests a more positive reading: that the
intertexts offer a way of frustrating the linguistic oppression of the play through a
poetic use of language. By making language do what it has not previously done, the
speaker can postpone a final denotation and continue to connote. The obvious
problem is that Kaspar’s escape-route employs words already coined by another.
He has not formed his own solution, he has reactivated an older phrase.
Handke’s intertextual tactic is also worthy of further comment. Almost all the
quotations in the play are neither that well known nor instantly identifiable. It
would seem that Handke uses his intertexts to allow the audience to believe that
unexpected linguistic usages can question the dominant context, only to discover
afterwards, maybe from a volume of criticism, from the press, or by word of mouth,
that that is not the case. The play can be seen to have a time-delayed effect: an idea
for an evasion of the oppressive forces in the play is set up, only to be disappointed
at some unknown date in the future. The spectator then has to reconcile this
discovery with his or her experience of the lines in performance. Context is the only
temporary escape, yet its emphasis marks the shift from the strictures of the ‘picture
theory’ to the relative freedoms of Wittgenstein’s later concept, the ‘language game’.
Phoebe’s final quotation from Hegel plays a similar role in that it presents familiar
words in an unlikely context, but in this case the quotation also sheds light on all
that has gone before it. Phoebe, of course, has been presenting learned lines in odd
places for the whole of the third phase. She is, by virtue of this, a perfect vehicle for
the final speech. For those unfamiliar with the text, I reproduce it here in full, in
Fassbinder’s capitalized letters:
durch den verstand pflegt das vermo¨gen der begriffe u¨berhaupt ausgedru¨ckt zu
werden; er wird insofern von der urteilskraft und dem vermo¨gen der schlu¨sse als
der formellen vernunft unterschieden. vornehmlich aber wird er der vernunft
entgegengesetzt; insofern aber bedeutet er nicht das vermo¨gen des begriffs
u¨berhaupt, sondern der bestimmten begriffe, wobei die vorstellung herrscht, als
ob der begriff nur ein bestimmtes sei. wenn der verstand in dieser bedeutung von
der formellen urteilskraft und der formellen vernunft unterschieden wird, so ist
er als vermo¨gen des einzelnen bestimmten begriffs zu nehmen. denn das urteil und
der schluss oder die vernunft sind selbst als formales nur ein versta¨ndiges, indem
sie unter der form der abstrakten begriffsbestimmtheit stehen. der begriff gilt
aber hier u¨berhaupt nicht als bloss abstrakt bestimmtes; der verstand ist daher
14 Jeffrey Herrick, ‘Peter Handke’s Kaspar: A Study of Linguistic Theory in Modern Drama’, Philological
Quarterly, 63 (1984), 219, and Gay McAuley, ‘The Problem of Identity. Theme, Form and Theatrical Method
in Les Ne`gres, Kaspar and Old Times’, Southern Review, 8 (1975), 63.
MLR 95:4 (2000), 1053-63 © Modern Humanities Research Assn
Dramaturgies of ‘Sprachkritik’1062
von der vernunft nur so zu unterscheiden, dass jener nur das vermo¨gen des begriffes
u¨berhaupt sei. (B, p. 550–51)
Hegel’s dense style and unqualified use of philosophical terms makes the text
difficult to comprehend at first. Its stockpiling of ideas in such a short space also
adds to its perceived difficulty. This, I believe, is part of its theatrical appeal to
Fassbinder. The text requires work on the part of the audience if it is to make any
sense. It re-presents the linguistic problematic that has run through the play. The
process of decoding and making sense of the lines refers back the themes of the play
as a whole. Language has been revealed as a powerful means through which one
character can oppress, cheat, humiliate, coerce, or disown another. Its instrumental
function has routed all others. By calling language into question both by Phoebe’s
odd juxtaposing of learned lines and by the final speech, Fassbinder is able to
criticize both the language of the three phases and the situations they depict. The
partial explanation of this is found in the Hegel text itself. Understanding,
‘Verstand’, is primarily set against Reason, ‘Vernunft’. But Hegel goes on to qualify
this distinction. The interpretation of the Notion, ‘der Begriff ’, is sanctioned by
Understanding. Yet the Notion does not come from the abstract realm (some
eternal, mystical site of universals), it is more material than that. The Notion
becomes more contingent on its contexts.15 Understanding and Reason are thus
more flexible and are, in fact, closer to each other than the original opposition
presumed. We can conclude, with respect to Blut, that the Notions, with which we
are confronted in the many scenes, are only manifestations of a particular,
historically dependent configuration of Understanding and Reason.
Contingency is a central theme in Blut. The social vignettes with which the
audience is bombarded are to be found very much within the its experience. The
swiftness of recognition on the audience’s part points squarely to the contemporary,
through familiar situations and accessible colloquial forms. In this way Fassbinder
takes up Handke’s social critique and attempts to historicize it within the frame of
situations the audience recognizes. Yet the spectator is able to recognize them only
because of their language (and their translation into body language). Fassbinder,
like Handke, acknowledges the difficulties of breaking out of ossified social structures
that are reinforced by equally rigid linguistic and semantic ones. Because language
helps construct social relations (as noted in Handke’s critique of the ‘picture theory’),
language must become a central consideration if one wants to change them. The
playwright’s employment and foregrounding of intertext points to the potential for
liberation as coming from a playful and challenging use of language, which none
the less does not conform to a spurious bourgeois notion of originality.
In conclusion, then, one may register the similarities between Fassbinder and
Handke. Both exploit the dramatic medium to expose the artifice of language (and
to oppose its status as ‘natural’) in order to suggest the possibility of social change.
Through a conscious reuse of intertext both signal the primacy of context over
content: the words themselves may be familiar, but it is their deployment that opens
the possibility of Sprachkritik. The most marked difference in their strategies is their
15 It is interesting to note that there is a confluence of ideas between Fassbinder and Handke here. In Handke’s
Bu¨chner-Preis-Rede of 1973, he rails against the abstraction of ideas, preferring to oppose it with the complexity
of experience and memory.
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manipulation of the actor–audience relationship. Fassbinder introduces the audi-
ence to recognizable scenes of everyday oppression. The scenes never directly
announce their subject-matter and require input from the spectator to generate
meaning. This task is not too testing, yet its continual repetition points to the tacit
collusion between stage and auditorium. Phoebe makes this collusion overt by
throwing the trusted words back at the spectator and thus causes irritation in the
audience, which may lead to raised awareness of the linguistic issues. Handke, on
the other hand, uses a conscious theatricality from the outset. Meaning is generated
out of a contradiction between Kaspar and the Einsager. The mechanisms of
signification are laid bare before the audience’s eyes. The interval thus comes as
more of a shock, when the audience is made to confront its own acceptance of
linguistic commonplaces. Only once the spectator has experienced the prison house
is the potential for escape presented in the form of poetically protean intertexts.
Handke’s dramaturgy moves between distance (Scenes 1–58) and proximity
(Scene 59) and then returns to distance (Scenes 60–65) in a journey that demarcates
the elements of its dynamic quite clearly. For Fassbinder, the process is one of a
gradual awakening of curiosity in the spectator. The first phase sets itself up for its
fall in the second. The rapid succession of second-phase scenes highlights the part
played by the audience in the generation of meaning, and the spectator oscillates
between spectacle and involvement. By the third phase, the audience is primed for
Phoebe’s attempt at bucking the system and exposing its foundations. Both plays
require strategies to activate the audience to effect their Sprachkritik. Handke creates
the context for criticism from the outset before confronting his audience with the
‘real’ examples of the processes explored on stage. Fassbinder uses a more covert
technique in that he shams a more conventional dramaturgy in order to turn it back
on the spectator later. Fassbinder ambushes the audience Handke treated with more
respect with a subtle dramaturgy that ends up accusing the spectator of collusion in
the acts of oppression that seemed confined to the stage.
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